A Trust Analysis Methodology for Pervasive Computing Systems by Lo Presti, S et al.
A Trust Analysis Methodology for Pervasive
Computing Systems
St´ ephane Lo Presti1, Michael Butler1, Michael Leuschel1
and Chris Booth2
1 University of Southampton, School of Electronics and Computer Science,
Southampton SO17 1BJ, United Kingdom; {splp,mjb,mal}@ecs.soton.ac.uk
2 QinetiQ ltd, WR14 3PS, Malvern, United Kingdom; cjmb@signal.qinetiq.com
Abstract. We present an analysis Trust Analysis Methodology for ﬁnd-
ing trust issues within pervasive computing systems. It is based on a sys-
tematic analysis of scenarios that describe the typical use of the pervasive
system by using a Trust Analysis Grid. The Trust Analysis Grid is com-
posed of eleven Trust Issue Categories that cover the various aspects of
the concept of trust in pervasive computing systems. The Trust Analysis
Grid is then used to guide the design of the pervasive computing system.
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1 Introduction
Pervasive computing [1] places the user at the centre of an environment pop-
ulated by services accessible through devices embedded in physical objects. In
contrast to the current mode of human-machine interaction, where all tasking is
performed by a human being, pervasive computing seeks to soften the cognitive
and physical burden for a human being within its environment, by enabling the
system to reason about the user’s situation. A plethora of new pervasive com-
puting systems has been implemented in the recent years and their success is an
important enabler for building electronic societies.
Agent systems have been shown to be a suitable paradigm for designing per-
vasive computing [2–4]. Collaborating agents, capable of describing, discovering
and accessing services dynamically, can assume important information and ser-
vice management roles in pervasive systems. To enable agents to reason about
the capabilities of the services on oﬀer, they may exploit the common under-
standing of terms, relations and services across communities promoted by the
Semantic Web [5]. At the human-machine interface, agents may interact with hu-
mans to elicit and report information, and to provide an atmosphere of ambient
intelligence [6].
The notion of trust has recently taken a central role in computing [7]. In
systems like pervasive computing where the focus is on the user, technical fea-
tures such as security are no longer suﬃcient to correctly design and implement2S t ´ ephane Lo Presti, Michael Butler, Michael Leuschel and Chris Booth
distributed systems. The subjective concept of trust not only enables users to
better understand the paradigm of pervasive computing, but also opens new
directions of research for solving existing problems, such as security [8], manage-
ment of online communities [9] or e-Services lifecycle [10]. Despite much work
tackling the issue of trust and some deﬁnitions of this concept spanning a wide
range of domains [11], there is no clear and shared consensus on the deﬁnition
of this concept, partly due to the fact that the deﬁnition depends on the context
of use.
Agent technologies will be of particular importance in pervasive environ-
ments because they can embrace the subjective and uncertain aspects of trust.
In some instances, agents within the system will eﬀectively become extensions of
the person, and must be given a capability to reason about trust in a way anal-
ogous to humans, in order to procure and oﬀer pervasive information services
seamlessly. To be able to determine how we can apply agent technologies that
promote trust in pervasive computing, we need to fully understand the trust
issues of signiﬁcance within potential pervasive applications.
In this paper we describe a Trust Analysis Methodology for highlighting the
key trust issues when designing pervasive systems. Section 2 outlines the various
steps of the approach, from devising a scenario to analyzing it, and ﬁnally draw-
ing conclusions regarding the system design. In Section 3, we give an example
that illustrates the approach. We compare the Trust Analysis Methodology to
related work in Section 4 and we ﬁnally conclude in Section 5.
2 The Trust Analysis Methodology
The goal of the Trust Analysis Methodology is to help in the design of the
pervasive system by highlighting the trust issues inherent to the system. It is a
guide rather than a model as it does not deﬁne rigorously exact terms but rather
provides a means to discover trust issues. Nevertheless we can give the following
deﬁnition of the term trust that is inspired from the literature and summarizes
our whole approach.
Deﬁnition 1 (Trust). An evolving, contextual and composite belief that
one principal (trustor) has that another principal (trustee) will perform certain
actions with certain expected results, when not all information about those ac-
tions is available.
The context of trust has four elements:
– a group of three elements called external context:
• the legal system (the law, legal entities, contractual agreements);
• the social environment (non-legal entities, rules of communication and
etiquette, culture, norms, social expectations);
• the material environment (technologies, costs, limitations);
– and one element which constitutes the internal context:A Trust Analysis Methodology for Pervasive Computing Systems 3
• the moral state (intentions, prejudices and tendencies, beliefs other than
trust, knowledge, past experiences and beliefs about other principals,
emotions); a particular constituent of this element is the relative weight
of the various constituents of the external context in the evaluation of
the trust belief.
The components of the trust belief are:
– Data components
Source versus Interpretation, and Accuracy;
– System components
Audit trails, Authorisation, Identiﬁcation, Personal Responsibility, Reliabil-
ity and Availability;
– Subjective components
Reasoning, Usability and Harm.
Quantiﬁable constituents are combined to compute the value of a trust metric,
which is the quantiﬁable part of the trust belief and is also dependent on the
context.
Each part of this deﬁnition is explained in one of the ﬁve steps of the Trust
Analysis Methodology. The methodology involves iteration over four steps, fol-
lowed by a ﬁnal ﬁfth step. Each step is described below.
2.1 Step 1: The Scenario
Trust in distributed computing is often discussed in terms of abstract concepts or
security features, and it is sometimes diﬃcult to appreciate the impact of partic-
ular trust issues on the users of the system. Because of the human-centric nature
of pervasive computing, it is critically important that trust is explored from the
user’s perspective. The Trust Analysis Methodology reﬂects this imperative by
working on a scenario.
A scenario is a short, ﬁctional narrative, set in the near future that describes
people’s daily lives, concentrating on their use of pervasive computing under
examination. The scenario is user-focussed and usually avoids descriptions of
how the technology works unless such descriptions clarify the users’ interactions
with the system. It is important that the scenario accurately reﬂects the way
in which people would use the pervasive technologies to support them in their
lives. Pervasive computing scenarios have already been designed in the context
of ambient intelligence [6].
A scenario should not be too long and should focus on a speciﬁc set of features
provided by the systems. This eases the writing of the scenario but may limit
the scope of the methodology results, as a longer scenario made of smaller ones
can introduce interactions between elements that were independent in the small
scenarios. We consider the scenario as a living document that will evolve during
the process of trust analysis to meet the needs of the users and of the system
designer.4S t ´ ephane Lo Presti, Michael Butler, Michael Leuschel and Chris Booth
A key point in the acceptance of the pervasive computing paradigm is its
applicability, which can be demonstrated by realistic scenarios. It is critically
important that these scenarios are validated by subject matter experts, so that
they plausibly depict people and processes within the application domain. A
central principle for pervasive computing design is to ﬁt the technology to the
task, rather than the opposite. To this end, the scenario should be, if possible,
validated by a person external to the trust analysis and the pervasive system
design, so that her opinion is not biased towards the technical environment
proposed.
To aid an understanding of trust issues, we have developed a number of plau-
sible scenarios which contain use-cases that highlight the interactions between a
user and her pervasive environment. We have also applied our methodology to
scenarios borrowed from other pervasive systems. The scenarios form the founda-
tions of our methodology and their development and analysis provide a valuable
holistic view of trust that can guide the design of the pervasive system.
2.2 Step 2: The Trust Analysis
The second step and foundation of our Trust Analysis Methodology involves
the Trust Analysis Grid. A sketch of a Trust Analysis Grid is given in Table 1.
The rows of the grid correspond to vignettes in the scenario. The columns of
the grid correspond to categories of trust issues that will be checked against the
vignettes. Our previous work [12] used a diﬀerent view on the Trust Analysis
Grid, corresponding to a rotation by 90 degrees (or the rows and the columns
are inverted) of the grid presented in this paper, which made the representation
of the previous results in the form of a grid less intuitive because there is an
unknown number of columns. The Trust Analysis Grid we use here is more
suited to the study of a scenario as it enables the reviewer to follow the ﬂow of
narration.
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Vignettes Since the scenario is written in a narrative style, only certain sen-
tences and pieces of sentences are of interest for analyzing the trust issues. A
vignette corresponds to one or several pieces of one or several sentences of the
scenario and constitutes a cohesive group with regard to the trust issues. In order
to make the vignettes more readable, they can contain pieces of sentence that do
not concern the trust analysis, for example when a sentence is incomplete. We
will indicate the pieces of sentence of interest to the trust analysis by formatting
them in italic. The various vignettes are examined in the Trust Analysis Grid in
the order where they appear in the scenario.
Trust Issue Categories Following the trust analysis of several scenarios in
a previous work [12], we classiﬁed the trust issues into eleven categories which
are partitioned into three groups. Trust Issue Categories correspond to diﬀerent
facets of trust that complement each other and are denoted by labels that are
deﬁned in Table 2. We assume that the generalisations that we derived from
the trust analysis are plausible because they have been derived from the user’s
interaction with the system represented in the plausible scenario [12].
It is important to understand that each category denotes a kind of trust issue
that is directly observed in a vignette, rather than being the consequence of such
an observation. For example, the category Source vs. Interpretation generally
follows from the category Reasoning, though this latter observation is not directly
observable in the scenario at that point.
Trust Issues Groups The groups of Trust Issue Categories correspond to
elements of trust at a higher level of abstraction. They are only used to organize
the Trust Issue Categories according to their abstract similarities.
– Subjective categories
Trust is inherently subjective in that it reﬂects the point of view of the
trustor [14]. The subjective categories involve the agent’s internal state and
knowledge and express its beliefs. They also provide part of the context that
is used to interpret trust relationships.
– System categories
These categories relate to the underlying components and services of the
pervasive system used in the scenario. This system may involve a physical
device, a computer program, or a more general socio-economic system.
– Data categories
These two categories describe the properties of the data from the point of
view of trust.
Values in the Grid Cells The ﬁrst version of our methodology [12] simply
checked each vignette against the eleven trust issue categories. This corresponded
to putting an X mark in the grid cells to indicate that the corresponding trust
issue occurred in the italic text in the vignette.
It was further found that this value format was not enough to describe accu-
rately some trust issues. The grid cells of the Trust Analysis Grid can contain:6S t ´ ephane Lo Presti, Michael Butler, Michael Leuschel and Chris Booth
Data Group
Source vs. Interpretation
An interpretation is data that has been obtained after the processing of other data
(the source). The interpretation is generally less trusted than the source data itself.
Accuracy
The level of detail of an information determines how precisely trust can be evaluated
in the system. The higher the accuracy is, the more conﬁdent the user will be that she
can trust this particular part of the system.
System Group
Audit trails
An audit trail lists all the actions performed and the events occurring in the system.
This information should not be modiﬁable, or at least a modiﬁcation should be de-
tected.
Authorization
Any agent accessing a piece of information or requesting a service must have the permis-
sion from the system to do so, which in turn may require that the user has authorized
it (or not denied it).
Identiﬁcation
Identity is important to diﬀerentiate the participants and communicate with one of
them. On the other hand, this identity may be limited (e.g. pseudonym) in certain
contexts in order to provide privacy.
Reliability
This property indicates that a service operates according to its speciﬁcation. Similarly,
the property can refer to the integrity of the data produced by the service.
Availability
Availability corresponds to the temporal constraints on a service that ensure that the
ﬂow of action in the system is not stopped for a period of time longer than expected
(this period may vary depending on the kind of actions).
Subjective Group
Personal Responsibility
A person must remain responsible for the actions she performs, since they are not
mediated by a trusted system. The property of accountability is important to put a
signiﬁcant level of trust in the system.
Reasoning
Each participant manipulates the data to process it, in order to make decisions or
answer a request. This process can weaken the trust another participant has in the
system if this reasoning does not appear correct.
Usability
This aspect of trust encompasses various elements, like the intrusiveness of the mech-
anisms used to interact with the user, or its usefulness. It is a crucial element of trust
in pervasive systems as they can greatly impede the user. Little work has been done
so far on this aspect of trust, as exempliﬁed by Bottoni and al. [13].
Harm
This aspect goes hand in hand with trust, since trust is a belief, and it may be mis-
leading and harm the user or the system. Loss of privacy, in the sense that personal
data has been accessed against the will of its owner, or loss of ﬁnancial assets are two
examples.
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– an X mark to indicate that this particular trust issue applies in its general
stance; the marks XX and XXX indicate values that are more, or respec-
tively much more, important as those marked with an X on the same row;
on the other hand, X values are not comparable between diﬀerent rows;
– if in a given row with four ﬁlled cells, one needs to relate two of them in
terms of importance (for example X and XX) and also relate the two others,
but independently from the ﬁrst two, then one can use diﬀerent letters X
and Y for the two pairs of values (the second one could be for example Y
and YYY); see Table 1 for an example;
– the name of a more precise issue; for example, the trust issue category Harm
can be reﬁned into physical or ﬁnancial.
2.3 Step 3: Peer Review
In the third step, the initial examination of trust issues in step 2 undergoes peer
review and cross-checking. Peer review supports the extraction of trust issues
from the perspective of another potential user, who may have a diﬀerent view
on trust issues. This peer review may be the occasion to discover some missing
trust issues and complement the reviewer’s point of view.
In practice, the peer review is a very useful exercise as it forces the reviewers
to explain their trust analysis, thus clarifying it. The peer review is typically done
during a meeting where the reviewers go through their Trust Analysis Grids and
compare them. Since trust is a subjective matter, they may argue on whether or
not a particular trust issue arises at one point of the scenario. This disagreement
may mean that a choice between contradicting requirements must be made by
the system designer.
The peer review may also be the consequence of trust analysis made from
the point of view of users of the system who have a diﬀerent role. For example,
an end user and a system administrator. The trust analyses are not generally
compatible due to contradictory requirements occurring between the roles, but
the peer review ensures that the overall approach to analyzing the pervasive
system is consistent.
2.4 Step 4: Scenario Reﬁnement
In the fourth step, the scenario is reﬁned by adding new text and vignettes,
or removing existing ones. The purpose of a scenario is to provide a framework
which illustrates possible applications of the pervasive computing system, and to
extract the most relevant trust issues. It is important that the scenario reﬂects
the trust concerns of all the stakeholders involved, and it should be updated to
represent diﬀerent priorities. However, these concerns evolve as the trust analysis
progresses and makes explicit the various trust issues.
The updated scenario is again validated by the domain experts who ﬁrst
validated it and another trust analysis is run by going back to step 2. This
sequence, composed of the trust analysis (step 3) and the scenario reﬁnement
(step 4), is iterated until the reviewer and system designer believe that it covers8S t ´ ephane Lo Presti, Michael Butler, Michael Leuschel and Chris Booth
adequately, respectively, the trust requirements and the functionalities of the
pervasive system.
2.5 Step 5: Guiding the Design of the Pervasive System
The four previous steps have already provided some insight into the trust issues
underpinning the pervasive systems and are a means to virtually explore the
possible solutions provided by the system. In that sense, it follows the tradi-
tional design phase in software development based on use-cases. The last and
ﬁnal step of our methodology consists in using the Trust Analysis Grid to draw
some guidelines in order to help in the design of the pervasive systems under
consideration. We describe below two possible approaches for the examination
of the Trust Analysis Grid.
Identifying Signiﬁcant Areas A simple visual examination of the Trust
Analysis Grid can give the system designer an overview of where the signiﬁ-
cant areas are in the scenario. Because of its visual nature and the fact that its
vertical dimension corresponds to the sequential ﬂow of the scenario, the Trust
Analysis Grid can, in a certain way, be considered as a map of the trust issues
in the pervasive system under examination. The various areas of this map can
give us some guidance on how to best design the system as we show below with
three examples.
Firstly, we can decompose the Trust Analysis Grid into three areas corre-
sponding to the three groups of Trust Issue Categories Subjective, System and
Data. This general typology of trust indicates the kind of expertise that is re-
quired for designing the system. A Subjective-group system may require a system
designer with knowledge of social science and/or the law, and human-computer
interface. A System-group system corresponds to a system where the infrastruc-
ture plays a central role and where a technical experts in pervasive computing
may best practice his abilities. A Data-group system can be designed by an
expert in data management and processing.
Secondly, we can also examine each column of the Trust Analysis Grid in-
dividually. The full columns indicate that the corresponding trust issue is pre-
dominating in the pervasive system. This means that the system components
proposed to solve this Trust Issue Category in the design are given special at-
tention and that enough resources are devoted to them. Ideally, the few Trust
Issue Categories which have the most values in the Trust Analysis Grid should
correspond to an additional veriﬁcation pass following the system design (in re-
verse order of how full the Trust Issue Categories are, so that the most full Trust
Issue Category is veriﬁed last) that will check that these concerns are mitigated.
Thirdly, a row or a sequence of rows where a lot of values are present probably
indicates a crucial point in the scenario. This corresponds to a part of the system
that is critical regarding trust and where additional attention must be paid.
Another sub-scenario may be created to describe in more precise terms how the
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analysis can be run. Following the system design, this point in the scenario must
be veriﬁed thoroughly.
Matching Technologies Against the Scenario Rather than use the previous
informal guidelines, one can try to analyze the Trust Analysis Grid in a more
systematic way to draw some more accurate conclusions. Though it is not easy
because of the subjective nature of the trust issues that are represented in this
grid, it can still shed an interesting light on it. As the purpose of our approach
is to help in the design of the pervasive system, any means to understand how
best to do this is beneﬁcial to the system designer.
We ﬁrst tried to understand how to introduce the technological elements into
our approach. This was done by devising a Trust Analysis Grid of the various
common technologies and techniques used in pervasive computing, see Table 3.
We then have two Trust Analysis Grids, one corresponding to the scenario and
the other to the technologies. The suitability of a particular technology at a
given point (sequence of vignettes) in the scenario is given in terms of how close
its pattern (a row of eleven cell values) matches the area corresponding to this
point in the Trust Analysis Grid of the scenario.
This pattern matching technique diﬀers from the previous heuristic method
in that it relates the informal analyses of scenario and technologies, and provides
a point of anchorage for a more formal approach. As more scenarios are analyzed
against the Trust Analysis Grid in Table 3, this grid will be reﬁned in order to
better represent the trust issues of pervasive computing.
3 Illustration of the Methodology
3.1 Introduction
To illustrate the Trust Analysis Methodology, we describe here a scenario based
on a Pervasive Theme Park. The scenario is presented in Section 3.2, then its
Trust Analysis Grid is given in Section 3.3 and Section 3.4 ﬁnally outlines some
comments on the system design.
This park is named Vaughn Park and provides a lot of fun rides for the whole
family. It is fully equipped with pervasive computers, for example information
kiosks with tactile screens can be very easily found in all parts of the park. The
park is designed as a closed environment, meaning that no intruder can penetrate
inside and that no customer or computer signal can get outside. Customers buy
tickets equipped with location technology (e.g. wi-ﬁ, RFID) at the entrance of
the park and then indicate if they belong to a group, for example a family.10 St´ ephane Lo Presti, Michael Butler, Michael Leuschel and Chris Booth
Vignette in
the scenario
Trust Issue Categories
Data System Subjective
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)(11)
Wireless Network X X X X X X X X
Grid Computing X X X X X X X
Peer-to-Peer Network X X X X X X
Sensors X X X X X X
Data Records X X X X X X X
Network Traﬃc X X X X
Audio and Video Data X X X X X X
Speech Data X X X X X
Pads X X X X
Location and Context X X
HUDs X X
Personal Agents X X X X X X X
Service Agents X X X X X X
Encryption X
Digital Signatures X X
Authorisation Mechanism X X X X X
Authentication X X X X X
Time Limited Leases X X X X X X X
Domain-based Security X X X
Legend of the column numbers
(1): Source vs. Interpretation (2): Accuracy (3): Audit Trail
(4): Authorisation (5): Identiﬁcation (6): Availability
(7): Reliability (8): Personal Responsibility (9): Reasoning
(10): Usability (11): Harm
Table 3. Trust Analysis Grid of Technologies
3.2 The Scenario
Janet and John are having a great time at Vaughn Park, but now that they
have been on all the rides they wanted to, except for Hubris which has a long
queue, they are beginning to get a little bored. They and their parents have
joined Hubris’ virtual queue, but there is an estimated wait of over an hour until
they will be able to ride. Their parents suggest that they try one of the pervasive
games the park oﬀers. While they play, the parents have a coﬀee at a caf´ e.
The information kiosk can tell that they are waiting for Hubris. And it also
knows that Janet and John have been on many of the rides that are likely to
interest them. So the system thinks that the Treasure Hunt game is a good
candidate for them. Indeed it is, because they choose to play the game.
The ﬁrst clue is a simple one: ”Can you ﬁnd a big squirrel?” (If they were
not old enough to be reading yet, they could be given picture-only clues, but
only if their parents played along with them.) Janet remembers that there is a
squirrel on one of the Merry-go-rounds in the green area.A Trust Analysis Methodology for Pervasive Computing Systems 11
When they ﬁnd the Merry-go-round they go up to an information kiosk. The
kiosk knows they are playing Treasure Hunt, and that they are looking for a
big squirrel. The one on the Merry-go-round is not the one it had in mind, so
it displays a message saying ”Good try. But this one isn’t big enough, can you
ﬁnd a bigger one? It’s quite close.”
John notices a topiary cat on the other side of the Merry-go-round, and
wonders whether there might be some more topiary nearby.
There is the squirrel, sculpted in the hedging. And neither of them had
noticed it at all when they were on the Merry-go-round. The nearby kiosk con-
gratulates them warmly, and asks them to ﬁnd a big cleaning implement. They
do not really know what to look for, so they do not move. The kiosk gives them
a bigger clue: ”who might use a cleaning implement, but not necessarily for
cleaning?” That’s it. Oﬀ they go, to the haunted house, which has a witch.
After successfully solving several more clues, the ﬁnal clue leads them to
Hubris, where they ﬁnd their parents waiting. Their ride is great, and they go
home afterwards talking nineteen to the dozen about their great day out.
3.3 Trust Analysis
Table 4 presents the Trust Analysis Grid resulting from the analysis of the
scenario. The column numbers are the same as in Table 3. We illustrate in the
following how the grid is ﬁlled on the example of the penultimate row. This table
is the one obtained after steps 3 (peer review) and 4 (scenario reﬁnement) of the
approach, these steps not being shown here for the sake of simplicity.
This row corresponds to a vignette in the scenario where the children do not
understand what they should be looking for, and the kiosk gives them a clue.
The piece of sentence of interest here is the bigger clue.I ti sausability feature,
as it will make the Treasure Hunt game more usable to the children, and it
requires the system to reason about the situation, e.g. detect that the children
are waiting for a clue because they are not standing in front of the kiosk. Hence
the marks in columns (9) and (10). The input of this process is the activity of
the children, which is their personal responsibility, while the output is a clue,
which should reliably help the children. Hence the marks in columns (7) and (8).
The other categories do not apply to this piece of sentence of interest.
3.4 Guiding the Design
We ﬁrst notice that the Trust Analysis Grid is mostly ﬁlled with trust issues from
the group Subjective. This is explained by the fact that the Pervasive Theme
Park is a closed environment, what greatly simpliﬁes the security requirements,
and that the services provided are not data-intensive. This result indicates that
the application described in the scenario is a quite subtle application, what
corresponds to intuition that it is user-friendly, and that the emphasis should be
put on the perception of the system by the user during the design.
From the point of view of each Trust Issue Category individually, Personal
Responsibility and Reasoning are those who are most ﬁlled. The ﬁrst category12 St´ ephane Lo Presti, Michael Butler, Michael Leuschel and Chris Booth
Vignette
in the
scenario
Trust Issue Categories
Data System Subjective
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)(11)
estimated wait of over an hour time
unit
The information kiosk can tell ... X
... that they are waiting X X X
it also knows that Janet and John
have been
X XX
rides that are likely to interest them XX X XX
so the system thinks that X XX
they choose to play the game X X
(If they were not old enough to
be reading yet, they could be given
picture-only clues, but only if their
parents played along with them.)
XX X XX X
The kiosk knows they are playing
Treasure Hunt
X X X
the one it had in mind ... X X
... so it displays a message X X X
The nearby kiosk congratulates
them warmly
X X X X
They don’t really know what to look
for
X X
The kiosk gives them a bigger clue X X X X
the ﬁnal clue leads them to Hubris X X X X
Table 4. Trust Analysis Grid of the Scenario
corresponds to the fact that the user has the total freedom to walk around the
Pervasive Theme Park during the game and she is responsible for her actions
when looking for the clues, while the system is not interacting with her. The
second category underlines the fact that the game corresponds to a hunt and
must be adapted to the way the user performs it. To make the application more
trustworthy, the user expects the system to act with her in a way consistent with
the status of her hunt. The system designer will include in the system inference
capabilities of good quality.
Finally, no row distinguishes itself from the others, notably due to the overall
importance and continuous presence of trust issues from the Subjective group.
This may be explained by the fact that the application is focused on the user
whose mobility prevents to concentrate the system capabilities into one partic-
ular part of the scenario.
4 Related Work
The requirement aspects from our Trust Analysis Methodology share some sim-
ilarities with the approach taken by the TRUST-EC project [15]. This approachA Trust Analysis Methodology for Pervasive Computing Systems 13
lists and analyzes the common applications in e-Commerce. It then deduces from
this analysis a list of requirements for trust and conﬁdence in this domain. These
requirements all have an equivalent Trust Analysis Category in our methodol-
ogy, which adds the categories Source vs. Interpretation, Reasoning and Usability.
This points to the fact that many of the trust methodologies tackle the problems
from a technical point of view, rather than a human-centric one. Thus, many of
the subjective facets of trust are evaded, as these objective concepts are more
directly applicable to real-world applications.
The i∗ framework [16] is proposed to model non-functional requirements
(privacy and security) in multi-agent systems. A composite graph is used to
represent the relationships between actors of a system. Relationships are of four
types: goal, task, resource and softgoal. The i∗ graphs relate elements that are
very similar to the content of our Trust Analysis Grid and can be viewed as
a scenario annotated with keywords that are interrelated. The i∗ framework’s
expressive power and planar nature hinder a structured view of the trust issues
in the system. Furthermore, the only example of requirements studied in detail
for the i∗ framework is privacy, while usability and security (which should be
decomposed into more atomic properties as identiﬁcation and authorisation) are
only brieﬂy mentioned.
Tan’s trust matrix model [17] is a means to analyze trust-building services for
electronic commerce. It proposes to represent a service in the form of a grid. The
grid rows correspond to properties of the service grouped into three layers, each
layer playing the same role as our Trust Issue Groups. Some of those proper-
ties correspond to our Trust Issue Categories (Information Integrity, Document
Interpretation) while others correspond to a ﬁne-grain decomposition of some
Trust Issue Categories. The grid columns correspond a theoretical decomposi-
tion of the notion of trust into four reasons, themselves decomposed into two
sources. The trust analysis in this framework is more suited to the examination
of a particular service oﬀered by a system, but it fails to capture the temporal
dimension of a scenario and is thus not directly applicable to pervasive comput-
ing. It is also more precise in that it considers more trust issues, but those issues
are more speciﬁc to the kind of services examined in this work.
Bændeland and Stølen’s [18] propose to analyze user trust in a net-bank
scenario. Their approach is closer to software engineering as they use the UML
notation to model the system and reuses the CORAS risk analysis methodology.
They deﬁne trust as a hierarchy of assets which must be protected from threats,
vulnerabilities and incidents. Evaluating in detail the risks associated with the
system under examination enables them to propose the solution to trust issues.
Their analysis methodology is partitioned into ﬁve sub-processes, from estab-
lishing the context to treating the risks. Our methodology spans the ﬁrst two
sub-processes of their methodology. On the other hand, this approach does not
explicit any deﬁnition of trust.14 St´ ephane Lo Presti, Michael Butler, Michael Leuschel and Chris Booth
5 Conclusion
If pervasive computing is to be the next successful paradigm for computing, us-
ability and compelling applications will not be enough to make it enter people’s
daily life. More eﬀorts are needed to both ﬁnd a suitable way to implement it and
to make it trusted. Agent systems are a relevant technology to implement this
vision, because it captures many of the aspects of pervasive computing applica-
tions, such as mentalistic attitudes, social behaviour and users’ mobility. Agents
will ultimately behave as humans by proxy in autonomic pervasive computing.
Trust is a key notion in this paradigm. It supports both a better understand-
ing of the system by the user and a better representation of the users’ needs
and concerns, since it is a human notion. We are investigating ways to create
trusted pervasive systems and devised a Trust Analysis Methodology to help in
the design and implementation of such a system.
Our approach is based on ﬁve steps. Firstly, pervasive computing scenarios
are written to illustrate the use of the system and are validated by subject
matter experts, ensuring a realistic representation of the system and of the trust
concerns from the user. Secondly, the scenario is analyzed by ﬁlling in a Trust
Analysis Grid that provides a means to discover the relevant trust issues. The
trust analyses are then cross-checked between the various reviewers in step 3,
and this leads to a possible reﬁnement of the scenario in step 4. Finally, the
ﬁfth step consists in deducing from the Trust Analysis Grid a set of more or less
formal guidelines for the system designer.
We are still applying the Trust Analysis Methodology to other pervasive com-
puting scenarios in order to further extend, reﬁne and stabilize it. In particular,
we are considering extending the format of the cell values, including the possibil-
ity to give accurate measures (numbers), and add to the cell value a probability
of occurrence of the particular trust issue. This extension of the cell value format
could form the basis of a numerical analysis that could, for example, be bound
to a risk analysis [18,19].
As we wish to model formally the design of the pervasive system [20], we
would also like to verify the Trust Analysis Grid against our formal models. The
ﬁnal models should integrate a model of the particular agent technologies used
to implement the system and will enable to have a higher conﬁdence that the
trust analysis is correct than the one obtained with semi-formal methodologies.
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